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Abstract 
There is a notable lack of measures of enduring beliefs, which are key etiological 
factors in Beck’s cognitive model of anxiety.  The Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale-2 was 
developed to address this need.  Items from the original AABS (G. P. Brown, Craske, Tata, 
Rassovsky, & Tsao, 2000) were reviewed and revised and additional items were added to 
cover the range of constructs identified as reflecting anxiety related expectancies while 
avoiding the confounding of cognition and affect.  Suitability of items was examined using 
cognitive interviewing (Willis, 2004).  The resulting set of 48 items was administered to an 
index sample of individuals reporting anxiety symptoms and a cross-validation sample of 
undergraduate students in order to derive a measurement model describing its internal 
structure.  The final, 33-item AABS-2 had a bifactor structure of one general and four 
specific factors, good fit to the data, common factor content across groups, acceptable 
precision in measurement and evidence of construct validity.   
Key Practitioner Message 
 Measures of enduring beliefs related to anxiety disorders are needed to assess etiological 
factors within cognitive therapy; while there are numerous measures of automatic 
thoughts, there are few measures of beliefs.  The present study sought to address this gap. 
 The items that originally appeared on ten rationally derived scales drawn from clinical 
phenomenology of anxiety disorders were eventually grouped into four group factors and 
one general factor in the course of psychometric analyses.   
 The group factors included ones expected to distinguish groups reporting panic, OCD, 
and social anxiety symptoms from other anxiety symptom groups, and this prediction was 
supported.   The majority of predictions regarding patterns or correlations were also 
supported. 
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 Further validation research is needed to evaluate the validity of the AABS and its 
subscales in predicting course and outcome of psychotherapy.  
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According to the most recent estimates in the United States, nearly 30% of the 
population can expect to develop an anxiety disorder in their lifetime (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, 
Merikangas, & Walters, 2005), and anxiety disorders constitute the most prevalent mental 
health problem in the population (Barlow, 2004, p. 22).  Therapies for anxiety disorders have 
developed rapidly in the last few decades, particularly behavioral and cognitive behavioral 
(CBT) approaches.  A recent review identified over 1,000 outcome studies of CBT for 
different anxiety disorders (Hofmann & Smits, 2008) and found strong support for its 
efficacy. However, McNally (2007), while characterizing CBT for anxiety disorders as 
among the indisputable success stories in the mental health field, cautioned against 
overlooking the failure of many patients to benefit fully from existing CBT interventions or 
to maintain their gains, seeing this as an indication of the need for greater understanding of 
etiological mechanisms (p. 750).  
Indeed, advances in psychotherapy techniques and methods have substantially 
outpaced theoretical and conceptual developments in the understanding of anxiety disorders 
(D. A. Clark & Beck, 2011; D. A. Clark & G.P. Brown, In press), and the extent to which 
treatment efficacy can be enhanced further without commensurate progress in understanding 
of etiology and change mechanisms is open to question.  Current etiological models differ 
with regard to the role of cognition, particularly as it relates to the initiation of a fear 
response.  Models emphasizing physiological structures and processes (e.g., Ledoux, 1989;  
Mataix-Cols & Phillips, 2007; Ohman & Mineka, 2001) as well as  those emphasizing 
learning and behavior (Barlow, 2004; Foa & Kozak, 1986) tend to view initial anxiety 
responses as virtually reflexive and involving little cognitive mediation.  In contrast, models 
focusing on thoughts and expectancies (e.g., D. A. Clark & Beck, 2011) ascribe at least a 
contributory role to appraisals in the initial anxiety response.  Despite these differing 
emphases, these theories generally agree about cognitive processing subsequent to the initial 
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fear response, particularly with regard to the role elaborative appraisals play in perpetuating 
anxiety and contributing to the development of chronic difficulties.   
Evidence for the role of these elaborative appraisals in the development and 
perpetuation of anxiety disorders comes from studies that appear to demonstrate that 
experimentally manipulating expectancies predicts amplification and attenuation of anxiety 
responses (e.g., Rapee, Mattick, & Murrell, 1986; Craske & Freed, 1995).  However, there 
are limits on the inferences that can be drawn about the activation of pre-existing cognitive 
structures from study designs that are confined to demonstrating functional relationships 
between experimental manipulations and outcomes (see de Houwer, 2011, for a theoretical 
discussion of these types of inferences).  As Foa and Kozak (1986) note, “Invoking a 
matching explanation to account for fear activation risks circularity in the absence of other 
ways to assess the structure.  To obviate such circularity one must first identify the structure 
from self-reports, behavioral observations, and so on. Data about responding to matched 
information can then be used to validate hypotheses about the structure.” (p. 23).  Another 
source of support for the potential etiological role of cognitions comes from treatment 
outcome research.  Therapies that focus on changing expectancies of danger (e.g., Salkovskis, 
Clark, & Gelder, 1996; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1990) have been central strands of the 
CBT “success story.”  Individuals entering this type of therapy appear to have elevated 
danger expectancies.  When these expectancies are challenged, either through direct 
disputation or behavioral experiments, fear and anxiety are found to diminish (Hofmann & 
Smits, 2008).  However, moving past anecdotal accounts in order to study reported cognitive 
content systematically again requires the availability of valid measurement instruments.  As 
was true of the experimental research described above, inferring a cognitive etiology cannot 
be based solely on observing an outcome (e.g., increase or reduction of fear) consistent with 
change in a putative underlying cognitive content or structure.  As Barlow (2004) notes, 
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“…inferring something about the nature of a psychopathological state by observing treatment 
effects is a very weak experimental approach, subject to a logical fallacy (post hoc ergo 
propter hoc, or “the results implies the cause).” (p. 126) 
It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude (1) that additional knowledge of expectancies 
and appraisals in anxiety stands to further the understanding of the etiology of anxiety 
disorders required for future advances in psychotherapy efficacy, (2) that this knowledge will 
need to rely to some extent on self report, and (3) that a central pitfall to be avoided is 
susceptibility to the circular logic of regarding a particular affective outcome (e.g., fear) as 
sufficient evidence for a putative cause.  With regard to the last point, the problem of 
circularity is particularly insidious when it comes to self-report scales, as it can be enshrined 
in the item content.  And, because this difficulty is under-recognized, there is no guarantee 
that so-called “gold standard” scales that appear to have substantial support in the literature 
are not susceptible to this criticism (see Hawkes & Brown, In press).  Indeed, one of the most 
widely used putative scales of cognitive expectancies, the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss, 
Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986), contains items such as “It scares me when my heart 
beats rapidly” and “It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task” that are 
premised on the unexamined assumption that a danger-based expectancy (“a rapid heartbeat 
signals physical catastrophe”) can be inferred on the basis of the reported occurrence of an 
anxiety response (i.e., being scared) following a threat cue (an unusual body sensation) 
(Lilienfeld, Turner, & Jacob, 1993;  Taylor, 1999).  G.P. Brown, Hawkes, and Tata (2009) 
directly examined this assumption regarding the items of the ASI in a cognitive interviewing 
(Willis, 2004) study and found that, in fact, respondents most often based their responses to 
ASI items not, as assumed, on the ongoing appraisal of their experience but rather on 
recollections of their previous anxiety reactions.  Moreover, responses were most often based 
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on gauging the recalled severity or frequency of past anxiety rather than the strength of the 
presumed prevailing belief.   
The present study describes the development of an updated version of the Anxiety 
Attitude and Belief Scale (AABS; G. P. Brown, Craske, Tata, Rassovsky, & Tsao, 2000), an 
instrument developed to address the methodological challenges described in the literature just 
reviewed.  Despite a large volume of measures of anxiety in general and cognitive variables 
specifically (e.g., Antony, Orsillo, & Roemer, 2001; D.A. Clark & G.P. Brown, in press), 
there is a notable lack of measures of enduring beliefs (D.A. Clark & Beck, 2011, p. 117).   
The updated scale was also intended to reflect substantial developments in the field since the 
appearance of the original scale, during which time the CBT treatment model was extended 
to the entire range of anxiety disorders.  With the item pool from the original AABS as a 
basis, items were revised and additional items were added in an effort to cover the range of 
constructs that have been identified as reflecting anxiety promoting expectancies while 
avoiding the confounding of cognition and affect.  The resulting scale was administered to an 
index and cross-validation sample of individuals reporting anxiety symptoms and 
undergraduates in order to derive a measurement model describing its internal structure.   
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
The index sample consisted of 434 participants (322 F, Age M = 33.5, SD = 11.0) 
who were members of online anxiety support groups organized around specific problems, 
such as panic, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and social anxiety.  Those reporting having 
been diagnosed with a mental health problem were 355 (82%), with 269 (62%) reporting 
being in treatment or having sought treatment in the past.  They were further asked, “If you 
are experiencing psychological problems, please characterise them by ticking all the 
following that apply” and were given the following choices: panic symptoms, obsessive 
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compulsive symptoms (e.g., ritualizing), constant excessive worrying, social anxiety, and 
depression.  The cross-validation sample consisted of 261 participants (148 F, Age M = 20.8, 
SD = 5.2) who were undergraduates from Royal Holloway University of London (N = 146) 
and Goldsmiths College University of London.   Undergraduates participated for course 
credit. 
2.1.3. Internet administration.  Participants completed the study on the Internet.  
The survey was hosted on www.surveymonkey.com.   
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1 Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale-2  The original AABS (G. P. Brown et al., 
2000) was developed to reflect the beliefs of individuals prone to develop anxiety but not to 
measure anxiety itself or to presuppose the experience of anxiety.  The initial step in item 
development was a broad, inclusive survey of the characteristics of thought content discussed 
in the literature as capable of triggering, worsening, or perpetuating anxiety in susceptible 
individuals.  The themes identified were:  Beliefs in the Adaptiveness of Worry; Probability 
Inflation; Catastrophizing; Anxious Avoidance; Vigilance for Body Sensations; Insanity and 
Loss of Control; Information and Reassurance Seeking; Social Rejection; Negative Social 
Evaluation; Magical Thinking; Emotional Reasoning; and Responsibility.  Items were then 
written to reflect these themes and were for the most part expressions of expectancies 
regarding the outcome of specific experiences (e.g., vigilance for unusual body sensations 
based on the belief that they signal a physical or mental catastrophe, reflected transparently in 
the item: “An unusual physical sensation in your body is likely to be a sign that something is 
seriously wrong with you.”).   Although the constructs represented were ones that had often 
been proposed as potential etiological factors for specific disorders, they were not necessarily 
expected to map directly onto diagnostic criteria but rather to be present to varying degrees 
across individuals at risk for the range of anxiety disorders.  Likewise, it was expected that 
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subsequent psychometric procedures would reduce the number of categories to a smaller set 
of more general constructs due to the expected high degree of overlap of nominally different 
constructs. 
The instructions for the AABS were adapted from those of the Dysfunctional Attitude 
Scale, a similar scale of beliefs related to depression (Weissman & Beck, 1978).  The 
instructions were:  “This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes 
hold.  Read each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with the 
statement.  For each of the attitudes, choose the number matching the answer that best 
describes how you think.  Because people are different, there is no right answer or wrong 
answer to these statements.  To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of 
looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like most of the time.”   Items were rated 
by respondents on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 100, with anchor points at 20, 
40, 50, 60 and 80 percent.   AABS responses are scored from 1 to 7, with higher scores 
indicating greater belief in anxiety promoting attitudes. 
Using an undergraduate sample, G.P. Brown et al. (2000) found three underlying 
dimensions of the AABS:  Vigilance-Avoidance, Catastrophizing, and Imagination.  
Evidence for the construct validity of the AABS was provided by a cross-lagged panel 
analysis over a span of two weeks that included the AABS, the DAS, and measures of anxiety 
and depression.  Whereas the AABS was correlated with the DAS and with both depression 
and anxiety, AABS score predicted anxiety over time but not depression, and Time 1 anxiety 
did not predict AABS scores, suggesting that the AABS measured constructs that were 
specific to anxiety and not to depression and that these constructs were antecedents rather 
than consequences of anxiety.   
Prior to developing potential items for the AABS-2, the existing AABS items were 
first evaluated in terms of whether they appeared to assess appraisals. Information on the 
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original 58 AABS items was available from the G.P. Brown et al. (2009) cognitive 
interviewing study evaluating the ASI, within which they served as a logical comparison for 
the ASI items with respect to the issue of measuring danger-based expectancies explicitly 
rather than imputing their operation from the report of a corresponding anxiety response.  
Verbal protocols for the items were examined closely following Green and Gilhooly's (1996) 
recommendations for carrying out protocol analyses, and items were retained if they  were 
judged by two raters using a standardized coding system to be based upon appraisals and 
expectancies (please refer to G.P. Brown et al. [2009] for details of the procedure).  Certain 
items were rewritten based on the cognitive interviewing responses.   
The retained and rewritten items were grouped into four rational scales loosely related 
to the three factors found by Brown et al. (2000); these were:  Imagination, Caution, Body 
Vigilance, and Social Sensitivity.  A second comprehensive review of the literature was then 
carried out to identify constructs described as representing susceptibilities to anxiety 
disorders which were not reflected in the existing rational scales, either because they had 
been overlooked for the original AABS or because they had been introduced into the 
literature subsequently.  Five additional constructs were identified:   Emotional Reasoning, 
Loss of Control, Risk Avoidance, Catastrophizing Beliefs, and Certainty.  Additional items 
were generated aimed at fully capturing these ten dimensions.  The list of rational scales and 
example items are shown in Table 1.  Finally, an additional cognitive interviewing study was 
conducted of the new item pool with four anxiety outpatients using the exact procedure and 
interview schedule employed by G.P. Brown et al. (2009).  Each participant completed 53 
prospective AABS-2 items while thinking aloud.   As a result of this analysis, five of the 53 
revised items were removed from the pool and several other items were reworded.  The 
remaining 48 items were examined for duplicative wording, and nine additional items were 
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removed on this basis.  The remaining 39 items were administered to the current samples of 
participants. 
2.2.2. Symptom measure:  The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales - 21 (DASS-
21).The DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a short form of the original 42-item self-
report measure developed by the same authors to assess current emotional states of anxiety, 
depression and stress (the last scale assessing a symptom cluster closest to the tension and 
preoccupation that characterizes generalized anxiety disorder [GAD]; (T. A. Brown, 
Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997).   The scales have been validated against other 
relevant measures and have been found to possess good reliability in both clinical and 
community samples (e.g., Henry & Crawford, 2005).  Applying Henry and Crawford’s 
United Kingdom norms, mean scores on all three subscales in the support group samples 
were in the severe range.  
2.2.3. Criterion measures.  A battery of well-established anxiety-related criterion 
measures was administered to the support group samples.  General information regarding 
each scale is provided; refer to the listed references for further information about their 
applications and psychometric properties.  Cronbach’s α’s for the current study are shown in 
Table 3.   
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3).The ASI-3 (Taylor et al., 2007) is an 18-item 
self-report measure assessing fear of anxiety symptoms.  It has three subscales:  physical, 
cognitive, and social concerns. The ASI-3 was devised to improve on the psychometric 
properties of previous versions of the scale and has demonstrated evidence for convergent, 
discriminant, and criterion validity.  
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (BFNE-S).The Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation scale is a unidimensional measure of reactions to possible negative evaluations by 
others.  Following the recommendations of Rodebaugh, Woods, et al. (2004), a shortened 
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form was used employing only the eight non-reverse-scored items from the original 12-item 
BFNE.   
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ).The PSWQ (T. J. Meyer, Miller, Metzger, 
& Borkovec, 1990) is a 16-item self-report unidimensional measure of propensity to worry 
and has been used to discriminate between those with a diagnosis of GAD and other anxiety 
disorders. 
Thought-Action Fusion Scale-Revised (TAFS-R). The TAFS-R is a bidimensional 
19-item self-report scale designed to measure thought-action fusion, the conflation of a 
thought of something happening with the possibility of its actual occurrence.  The two 
subscales of the TAFS-R are Likelihood TAF (“If I think of myself being injured in a fall, 
this increases the risk that I will have a fall and be injured”) and Morality TAF (“If I wish 
harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing harm”).  The TAFS generally discriminates 
OCD from other anxiety disorders and depression (e.g., J. F. Meyer & Brown, 2012).   
2.3. Data Analysis 
The exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were conducted using the MPlus 7 
software program (Muthén & Muthén, 2008).  Factors were extracted from the sample 
correlation matrix using maximum likelihood estimation robust to non-normality in the data.  
Model fit for the factor analyses was ascertained using the minimum fit function 2.  As 2 
values are potentially inflated by large sample sizes, fit was also examined using two global 
model fit indices: root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) and the 
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990).  The RMSEA provides a measure of model fit 
relative to the population covariance matrix when the complexity of the model is also taken 
into account.  It had been suggested that RMSEA values of < .05 indicate good fit, values of 
.05 to .08 indicate moderate fit, and values above 0.1 indicate poor fit (Browne & Cudeck, 
1993), but more recent simulation studies caution against the use of fixed cutoff points for 
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making decisions about goodness-of-fit (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, & Paxton, 2008).  The 
CFI provides a measure of the fit of the hypothesized model relative to the baseline or 
independent model, with values usually ranging from 0.00 to 1.00.  For the CFI, values above 
.95 are suggestive of good model fit, and values above 0.90 are suggestive of acceptable 
model fit. 
3. Results 
3.1. Exploratory and confirmatory structural equation modeling 
 An initial exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using an oblique GEOMIN rotation was 
carried out to identify weak items and help determine an appropriate number of factors to 
extract.  For this analysis, there were seven eigenvalues over one; the first eight eigenvalues 
were 15.60, 2.80, 2.09, 2.00, 1.66, 1.27, 1.02 and 0.90.  A parallel analysis was next carried 
out that suggested five factors should be extracted; the sixth eigenvalue (1.27) was the first 
one below the respective random eigenvalue from the parallel analysis (1.37).  The factor 
content approximated the rationally derived scales; however, four items failed to load 
saliently on any factor (loading > .40), and so these were dropped from further analysis. 
A further EFA model was then tested on the remaining 35 items. A parallel analysis 
on this set of items also suggested five factors should be extracted from the data, and the 
global model fit indices from a one factor model of the data did not indicate good model fit, 
2 (560) = 3803.673, p< .0001; RMSEA = 0.116, CFI = 0.62.  Given the apparent 
multidimensionality in the data, a plausible alternative factor model of the data was a bifactor 
model; in this case, a bifactor model with one general factor and four specific factors. We 
tested an exploratory bifactor model with all items free to load on the general and specific 
factors and using a BI-GEOMIN orthogonal rotation.  The model had an acceptable fit, 2 
(430) = 1229.406, p< .0001; RMSEA = 0.065, CFI = 0.91), but modification indices 
indicated that adding two correlated residual terms would improve the fit.  These were among 
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items with related content having to do with losing control (“It is possible to instantly lose 
control of your mind” and “It is possible to suddenly completely lose control of your 
behavior”) and two other items also related by theme (“Minor difficulties can easily get out 
of control and grow into major ones” and “Even with small problems, one thing can lead to 
another and quickly turn into something huge”).  Both of these are theoretically important 
areas of content. Including these residual terms increased the model fit, but the two “loss of 
control” items then no longer had any salient loadings (>.40), and so were removed and a 
final model fit with 33 items.  A final exploratory bifactor analysis was carried out with these 
remaining items, with the indices indicating very good global fit, 2 (372) = 781.217, p< 
.0001; RMSEA = 0.050, CFI = 0.95.  The results appear in Table 2.  Of the 33 items 
included, 19 had salient loadings (>.40) on the general factor as well as on one of the group 
factors, and 14 items loaded only on the general factor.  Based on the item content, names 
were assigned to group Factors 1 through 4, respectively, as follows:  Thought Manifestation, 
Exposure to Judgment, Body Vigilance, and Anxiety Based Reasoning.  Further information 
on the rationales for the names chosen is included in the Discussion.  A composite model-
based reliability coefficient was calculated using the above 33-item bifactor model; the 
reliability value was 0.97, indicating good reliability for the model.  
 A confirmatory factor analysis model of the 33 AABS items was tested in the cross-
validation sample to confirm the overall fit of the bi-factor structure (including the remaining 
single correlated residual term) in a separate sample drawn from a different (undergraduate) 
population. The global model fit indices indicated slightly poorer model fit, but were still 
comparable to those found in the index sample, 2 (444) = 1030.30, p< .0001; RMSEA = 
0.059, CFI = 0.88.  All items had their highest loadings on the same group factors as in the 
support group sample; however, four group factor loadings were <.40 but >.30 and one item 
loading was <.40 on the general factor.   There were no substantial modification indices. The 
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composite model-based reliability in this sample was 0.94, indicating good reliability for the 
model in this sample.    
3.2. Construct Validity 
 Predictions regarding the pattern of associations of the AABS-2 subscales with 
relevant criterion measures within the index sample were based on (1) predominant 
associated symptom cluster (i.e., anxiety); (2) common content area with criterion measures 
(e.g., Body Vigilance and ASI-3 Physical Concerns); and (3) known comorbidities, 
particularly for worry and social anxiety with depression.  These comorbidities are typically 
reflected in higher correlations with depression using comparable measures.  As shown in 
Table 3, the pattern of the magnitudes of correlations were mostly consistent with predictions 
(shown boldfaced).  The pattern of mean differences on the AABS-2 subscales between 
criterion symptom groups was also largely as predicted.  Symptom groups were formed based 
on the self-reported presence or absence of a symptom category (e.g., obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms; please refer to the Method for details).  Because more than one symptom group 
could be reported, a given individual might be part of the “symptom present” group for more 
than one category.  Mean differences (see Table 4) were analyzed using independent sample 
t-tests.   
4. Discussion 
The AABS-2 was developed to address the need for a valid measure of beliefs and 
expectancies representing potential etiological factors for anxiety problems and to reflect 
substantial developments in the field since the appearance of the original AABS.  There are 
few existing measures of this type, and these often suffer from shortcomings already 
discussed that limit the inferences that can be drawn from research in which they are 
employed.  The development of the AABS-2 described in the present study capitalized on 
advances in the field, both conceptual and technical, since the time that many of the available 
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measures were developed.  In particular, increasing emphasis is now being placed on valid 
construct representation (Bornstein, 2011; Embretson & Hershberger, 1996) in conjunction 
with the traditional multi-trait, multi-method approach of the last 60 years (Strauss & Smith, 
2009).  The development of the AABS-2 also benefited from analytic techniques that have 
been developed to implement these evolving conceptions of validity, such as cognitive 
interviewing (Willis, 2004) and other techniques drawn from the cognitive aspects of survey 
methodology approach (Schwarz & Sudman, 1996).  Finally, the measurement structure of 
the AABS-2 was evaluated using the most current approaches to exploratory and 
confirmatory latent variable and item response analyses.  The final five AABS-2 factors 
reflected a simple factor structure, a good fit to the covariance matrix in both the index and 
cross-validation samples, consistency of factor content across anxiety support group and 
undergraduate samples, and acceptable precision in measurement of the final factors.  
Preliminary validity analyses in terms of associations with theoretically related criterion 
variables and predicted mean differences between symptom groups provided support for the 
validity of the AABS-2 subscales.   
The approach taken to developing the AABS and AABS-2, in contrast to previous 
similar efforts, de-emphasized operationalizing a priori theory in favor of a bottom-up, 
neutral, and inclusive survey of potential content.  This approach  is similar in many respects 
to the one adopted within the Five Factor Model tradition in personality research (McCrae & 
John, 1992), which took as a starting point the entire lexicon of personal trait adjectives.  This 
approach particularly emphasizes care in the naming of factors.  As McCrae and John (1992) 
note, “Factor names reflect historical accidents, conceptual positions, and the entrenchment 
that comes from a published body of literature and from published instruments.” (p. 177).  
Although a number of the factors identified had clear links to previously identified constructs 
(e.g., intolerance of uncertainty, anxiety sensitivity, thought action fusion), these terms were 
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avoided as they implied mechanisms (sensitivity, intolerance, fusion) that have not been 
established empirically. Thus, as a starting point for understanding what the factors appeared 
to measure, high level inferences (Goldfried & Kent, 1972) were avoided if these moved 
beyond the behaviors described by the items loading on the factor. 
Items loading only on the general factor were drawn from two of the original 
rationally derived scales, “Anticipation” and “Intolerance of Uncertainty.”   The items are all 
concerned with uncertainty about the future and appear to relate to Barlow’s characterization 
of anxiety as a reaction to a perceived lack of control:  “a state of helplessness, because of a 
perceived inability to predict, control, or obtain desired results or outcome in certain 
upcoming personally salient situations or contexts” (Barlow, 2004, p. 64).  Other theories 
have also highlighted heightened vigilance as a central component of anxiety-proneness (e.g., 
(Eysenck, 1992).  Interestingly, this construct appears to be separate from the fear of loss of 
personal control that is central to Beck’s (Beck et al., 1990) formulation of particular anxiety 
states, such as panic.  Indeed, items relevant to the latter construct (e.g., “It is possible to 
suddenly lose control of your mind”) were eliminated in the course of the item analysis due to 
low factor loadings.  Other scales have been devised to reflect related constructs, but 
generally suffer from the pervasive shortcoming previously discussed of measuring beliefs in 
a manner that is confounded by affect.  For example, the Anxiety Control Scale (Rapee, 
Craske, Brown, & Barlow, 1996), which was devised to operationalize perceived lack of 
control as a psychological vulnerability to anxiety in line with Barlow’s formulation, 
discussed above, includes items which, similar to the items of the ASI, seek to measure 
beliefs by way of experiences of affect (e.g., “When I am frightened by something, there is 
generally nothing I can do”  and “Most events that make me anxious are outside my 
control”).    
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The first group factor of the AABS-2 contained beliefs clearly related to social 
anxiety.  D. M. Clark and McManus (2002) list the following aspects of social anxiety that 
are supported by empirical findings and are common to different degrees to a group of similar 
cognitive behavioral theories of social anxiety (see Rodebaugh, Holaway, & Heimberg, 2004, 
for a review):   “interpretation of external social events; detection of negative responses from 
other people; the balance of attention between external and self-processing; the use of 
internal information to make inferences about how one appears to others; recall of negative 
information about one’s perceived, observable self; and … problematic anticipatory and post-
event types of processing.” (p. 92).  This factor contains beliefs logically related to a number 
of these features, particularly those concerned with appearing anxious to others and being 
judged in this regard.  As such, it is conceptually related to and was found to correlate with 
the ASI “Social Concerns” factor, which, in common with the rest of the ASI, suffers from 
confounding with affect (e.g., “When I tremble in the presence of others, I fear what people 
might think of me” and “I worry that other people will notice my anxiety”).  The thrust of the 
items center on concealing signs of discomfort to avoid being evaluated; as such, it was 
named “Exposure to Judgment.”  Aside from the Social Concerns factor of the ASI, measures 
related to social anxiety in CBT research have generally not focused on enduring beliefs that 
promote social anxiety.  An exception is the Social Attitudes Questionnaire-Revised (D. M. 
Clark, 2001), which seems to measure a more comprehensive set of dimensions than either 
the AABS or ASI and not to be overly confounded with anxiety.  However, this scale is 
unpublished.   
The second group factor extracted included beliefs about the capacity for subjective 
thought to influence external events.  In keeping with the aim of naming factors descriptively, 
the label chosen for this factor was “Thought Manifestation”.  There is a clear link between 
this factor and the construct of thought-action fusion (TAF; Shafran, Thordarson, & 
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Rachman, September), and a large correlation was found with the TAF-S Likelihood Scale. 
Although the Thought Manifestation subscale measures beliefs connected to Likelihood TAF, 
it is not confined to OCD themes; it is therefore potentially suitable for exploring this 
variable transdiagnostically, in line with evidence that TAF is also likely to play a role in 
other anxiety disorders (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003; Hazlett-Stevens, 
Zucker, & Craske, 2002) 
The third group factor was labeled “Body Vigilance” and bears the closest apparent 
relationship to the content of the ASI Physical Concerns subscale, with which it was 
correlated, potentially offering an alternative measure of the construct of interest largely free 
of confounding with affect.  This factor also differs from the ASI subscale in not linking the 
misinterpretation of particular anxiety symptoms to a particular adverse outcome, whether 
imminent or remote.  As such, it may be seen as potentially related to both panic and health 
anxiety.  It is not difficult to envisage both advantages and disadvantages to employing such a 
scale to help explain these anxiety problems.  A respondent inclined to endorse a specific 
sensation-fear correspondence (e.g., as in the ASI item, “When I feel pain in my chest, I 
worry that I’m going to have a heart attack”) might not see fit to endorse the more general 
statement from the AABS (“An unusual physical sensation in your body is likely to be a sign 
that something is seriously wrong with you”).  On the other hand, a scale less tied to specific 
symptoms might better capture idiosyncratic or simply alternative interpretations (e.g., 
shortness of breath rather than palpitations interpreted as a precursor to a heart attack) better 
than one like the ASI in which the correspondence is pre-specified (“When I feel like I’m not 
getting enough air, I get scared that I might suffocate”).  Instances in which participants 
modified their responses because they did not endorse the precise correspondence between 
the predicate and consequent of an ASI item were commonly found in the G.P. Brown et al. 
(2009) cognitive interviewing study of the ASI, which is likely in practice to result in 
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idiosyncratic responding and ambiguity regarding how to understand the meaning of a 
particular rating.   
The items of the last group factor all relate to the inference of danger based on the 
occurrence of anxiety.  It was named “Anxiety Based Reasoning.”  The general concept is 
frequently cited in the literature.  Beck and Emery (1990) noted “Many anxious patients use 
their feelings to validate their thoughts” (p. 198).  Arntz, Rauner, and van den Hout (1995) 
called this “ex consequentia reasoning” because it implied the proposition “If there is danger 
I will be anxious, therefore if I feel anxious, there must be danger.”  In their study, both 
anxious patients and controls were influenced in their assessment of danger by objective 
indicators of danger within scenarios they read, but only patients were also influenced by 
information regarding anxiety responses.  Further investigation of this construct is warranted 
in order to determine whether respondents are basing their responses on inference (something 
identifiable that is not specified in the AABS items must be wrong, otherwise, why would I 
be anxious?) or whether anxiety is being afforded an unconscious signaling function (if I’m 
anxious, there must be something wrong, even if I can’t identify what it is).  In the latter case, 
Anxiety Based Reasoning, like Thought Manifestation, may operationalize so-called magical 
thinking. In addition, it might represent a susceptibility to perseverative behavior in line with 
Davey’s (e.g., Meeten & Davey, 2011) mood-as-information hypothesis.  To our knowledge, 
there are no previous measures of this construct, despite the importance it has been accorded 
in amplifying anxiety reactions.  A caveat is also in order for this factor, as it was the last 
factor extracted and explained the least variance.  The items are somewhat repetitive, raising 
the possibility that it might be a “bloated specific” (Kline, 1994)—a factor that emerges due 
to artifactually inflated covariance among the items (e.g., due to high content overlap) that 
does not meaningfully predict criterion variables.   
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As stated in the introduction, the central aim of the AABS-2 was to tap directly into 
ongoing anxiety related beliefs and expectancies rather than relying on inferring the operation 
of such beliefs from putatively corresponding affective outcomes (e.g., becoming scared 
following rapid heartbeat implying an expectancy regarding a heart attack). The latter, more 
usual approach flows from the understandable inclination within clinical research to focus on 
clinical phenomena within the populations in which they occur, where such correspondences 
are commonplace.  However, making progress in finding out about etiology requires 
extending the scope of measurement further along the continuum to encompass vulnerable 
but not yet symptomatic individuals, and to measure phenomena in a way that makes sense to 
respondents in this population.  The failure to do so is particularly evident in certain ASI 
items.  For example, the item “When my thoughts seem to speed up, I worry that I might be 
going crazy” presupposes experience of thoughts speeding up, reacting with worry, and 
making the specific conclusion of developing insanity, none of which might be endorsed by 
an otherwise vulnerable respondent who does not or has not yet had these experiences.  In 
recognition of this gap, the ASI instructs respondents to answer hypothetically, which results 
in different individuals effectively responding to items based on their differing previous 
experiences and ability to construct hypotheticals.  Waller (1989) demonstrated that such 
irregularities of applicability are likely to lead to anomalous psychometric results evident in 
unstable measurement structures that vary across populations.  This has been borne out with 
regard to the ASI (Deacon, Abramowitz, Woods, & Tolin, 2003) and the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (Sexton & Dugas, 2009; Norton, 2005).  In comparison, the AABS-2 
measurement structure was found to be comparable across symptomatic and non-
symptomatic groups.  
This last point bears on what might be considered a limitation of the study, namely the 
composition of the symptomatic group being members of internet support groups who had 
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self-identified as having an anxiety problem and not necessarily having received a clinical 
diagnosis.   It should first of all be noted that, whereas development of item content typically 
focuses on clinical phenomena, as just discussed, actual validation of scales in this area is 
frequently not carried out within the ultimate target population of those diagnosed with 
anxiety disorders, with relevant support groups (e.g., Shafran et al., 1996) and undergraduates 
(Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Reiss et al., 1986) frequently 
comprising the validation sample.  More substantively, there are grounds for arguing that 
sample heterogeneity and a greater continuity with non-clinical manifestations of anxiety 
could rather be seen as a strength of the study insofar as it affords a basis for avoiding the 
inclusion of content peculiar to clinical populations.  
In conclusion, the present study describes the development of an updated scale of 
anxiety-related beliefs and attitudes.  The scale was specifically constructed to address 
measurement pitfalls that have impeded progress in the identification and remediation of 
etiological factors in anxiety disorders.   Further research will be required to determine the 
extent to which AABS-2 represents an advance over the available body of measurement 
instruments in the field.  
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Table 1. 
Initial rational subscales and sample items 
Rational subscale Sample Item 
Imagination* Thinking about bad things that have 
happened to other people could cause the 
same thing to happen to you. 
Caution* To avoid disasters, you need to be prepared 
for anything. 
Body Vigilance* It is important to be on the lookout for the 
first, small signs of an illness. 
Social sensitivity* It is important to always appear fully at 
ease. 
Emotional reasoning Anxiety is generally a sign that something is 
wrong. 
Loss of Control It is possible to suddenly lose control of 
your mind. 
Risk avoidance The way to avoid problems is not to take 
any risks. 
Catastrophizing Minor difficulties can easily get out of 
control and grow into major ones. 
Certainty It is unwise to proceed with something 
unless you have all of the possible 
information you might need. 
*Scales derived from factor analyses of the original AABS. 
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Table 2 






Item  G  1  2  3  4  G Gr 
If you imagine something bad happening, it can help make that thing 
come true. 
.49 .75    
 
.47 .75 
Picturing something happening might cause it to really happen. .48 .74    
 
.34 .82 
Imagining things that might happen can help bring those things about. .45 .67    
 
.34 .63 
Thinking about bad things that have happened to other people could 
cause the same thing to happen to you. 
.61 .44    
 
.44 .57 
You should avoid being seen acting awkwardly. .60  .64   
 
.48 .61 
It would be difficult to ever live down the embarrassment of losing 
control of yourself or acting strangely in public.   
.58  .59   
 
.45 .57 
It is best not to let on if you are in public and feel that something is 
wrong with you. 
.59  .57   
 
.44 .60 
You should not allow yourself to be seen losing control of yourself in 
any way 
.56  .51   
 
.64 .39 
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People will make negative judgments if they think something is wrong 
with you. 
.54  .50   
 
.41 .44 
It is important to always appear fully at ease. .42  .49   
 
.37 .35 
It is essential to avoid being disapproved of by other people. .58  .44   
 
.63 .34 
It is important to be on the lookout for the first, small signs of an illness. .54   .59  
 
.50 .52 
It is necessary to continually be aware of signs that a health problem is 
developing. 
.70   .53  
 
.57 .52 
You should be constantly looking out for things happening within your 
body so that you can detect things going wrong. 
.71   .51  
 
.61 .59 
There is no such thing as being too careful when it comes to your health. .63   .47  
 
.49 .41 
Anxiety does not happen without there being a reason for it. .39    .73 
 
.37 .72 
People don’t experience anxiety unless there is actually something they 
should be concerned about 
.50    .66 
 
.45 .64 
If someone is feeling anxious, there must be something for them to be 
concerned about. 
.54    .63 
 
.46 .67 
Anxiety is generally a sign that something is wrong. .53    .43 
 
.42 .30 
One should always be on the lookout for trouble that might be 
developing. 
.79     
 
.75  
It is crucial to anticipate potential difficulties so that you have a better 
chance of avoiding them. 
.78     
 
.68  
THE ANXIETY ATTITUDE AND BELIEF SCALE-2 33 
 
To avoid disasters, you need to be prepared for anything. .78     
 
.66  
Planning every detail in advance is the only way to avoid unpleasant 
surprises.   
.77     
 
.73  
When making a decision, it is better to play it safe rather than risk 
making the wrong choice. 
.77     
 
.67  
The way to avoid problems is not to take any risks. .74     
 
.53  
It is better not to rock the boat than to make changes. .72     
 
.58  
Anticipating the worst outcome prepares you for the worst. .69     
 
.49  
Even with small problems, one thing can lead to another and quickly 
turn into something huge. 
.68     
 
.52  
In general, it is better to keep things the way they are than to take the 
risk of making things worse 
.68     
 
.62  
An unusual physical sensation in your body is likely to be a sign that 
something is seriously wrong with you. 
.65     
 
.59  
It is unwise to proceed with something unless you have all of the 
possible information you might need. 
.64     
 
.58  
Minor difficulties can easily get out of control and grow into major 
ones. 
.62     
 
.52  
Insanity can develop without warning. .43     
 
.32  
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Note. All factor loadings and correlations are significant at p< .0001.  G = General factor.   Factor names for Factors 1 through 4, respectively:  
Thought Manifestation, Exposure to Judgment, Body Vigilance, and Anxiety Based Reasoning.  Gr = Cross validation group factor 
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Table 3 


















      
Anxiety .93 .52 .36 .38 .39 .27 
Depression  .89 .46 .29 .46 .19 .24 
Stress .89 .50 .29 .41 .27 .35 
PSWQ .92 .50 .33 .45 .35 .30 
BFNE-II .96 .43 .27 .62 .15 .18 
ASI-3 
Subscales 
      
Physical 
concerns 
.88 .56 .31 .37 .52 .36 
Cognitive 
concerns 
.90 .54 .36 .49 .35 .36 
Social 
concerns 
.86 .55 .32 .78 .24 .21 
TAFS 
Subscales 
      
Likelihood .96 .55 .70 .33 .45 .45 
Morality .94 .44 .42 .27 .31 .41 
 
Notes.   Predicted correlations are boldfaced




Means differences [M (SD)]between groups on AABS-2 factors based on self-reported presence or absence of type of symptoms 








Absent 111 59.3 (18.4) 12.2 (6.5) 23.2 (7.9) 15.2 (5.8) 16.5 (6.3) 
Present 107 68.9 (19.6) 13.6 (6.9) 25.6 (7.7) 17.4 (6.2) 17.8 (6.2) 
 t(216), Cohen’s d 3.7, .50 1.6, .22 2.2, .30 2.7, .37 1.5, .20 
Obsessive-
Compulsive 
Absent 140 61.7 (18.2) 12.3 (6.1) 24.2 (8.0) 15.7 (5.9) 16.7 (6.0) 
Present 78 68.2 (21.2) 13.9 (7.6) 24.7 (7.6) 17.4 (6.4) 17.9 (6.7) 
 t(216), Cohen’s d 2.4, .33 1.7, .23 0.5, .07 1.9, .26 1.3, .18 
Worrying 
Absent 89 56.5 (16.4) 11.0 (5.7) 22.4 (8.1) 15.0 (5.9) 15.6 (5.9) 
Present 129 70.0 (19.8) 14.4 (7.0) 25.9 (7.4) 17.4 (6.1) 18.4 (6.3) 
 t(216), Cohen’s d 5.4, .73 3.9, .53 3.3, .45 2.9, .40 3.3, .45 
Social 
Anxiety 
Absent 89 57.5 (20.0) 11.3 (6.5) 20.2 (8.2) 15.9 (6.2) 17.0 (6.0) 
Present 129 68.5 (18.0) 14.0 (6.7) 27.2 (6.2) 16.6 (6.0) 17.2 (6.5) 
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 t(216), Cohen’s d 4.2, .57 2.9, .40 7.1, .97 0.9, .12 0.2, .03 
Depression  
Absent 110 61.0 (18.2) 12.3 (6.3) 23.0 (8.2) 15.8 (6.0) 16.9 (6.2) 
Present 108 67.1(20.4) 13.4 (7.1) 25.7 (7.3) 16.8 (6.2) 17.4 (6.4) 
 t(216), Cohen’s d 2.4, .33 1.1, .15 2.5, .34 1.2, .16 0.6, .08 
Notes.   N = 218.  One-tailed t significance = 1.7 (p = .05),  2.4 (p = .01).  Predicted differences are in bold type.
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